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ABSTRACT
Many of China's large state owned enterprises 
(SOEs) are widely recognised as being 
inefficient, loss making and a m ajor drain upon 
the country's resources. For the sustained 
progress of the country towards that of a 
m arket economy, further em phasis will need to 
be placed upon the reform of su ch  enterprises. 
While steps have already been taken in this 
direction, su ch  as the movement towards the 
corporatisation of su ch  enterprises and the 
selling of shares in selected enterprises, a 
logical next step is to move in the direction of 
privatisation to further enhance their economic 
perform ance. The experiences of other 
transition econom ies could be relevant in 
identifying what are the m ajor options and 
obstacles in th is regard, and which, if any, 
possess m ost applicability in the context of China. 
The paper reviews the recent perform ance of 
C hina's SO Es, identifies the reforms which have 
already been implemented in th is area, outlines 
the experiences of other transition econom ies in 
regard to the re-structuring of their SO Es, and 
places em phasis upon those options which are 
likely to be m ost applicable to the Chinese 
situation.
This paper was presented at the International Conference on The Economies o f 
Greater China, 7-8 July 1997, The University of Western Australia, Perth, 
Australia.
The legacy of central planning for China is the existence of unique 
economic problems in comparison to that of other rapidly 
developing economies in East Asia. In particular, two pressing 
and related problems have still to be overcome. Firstly a financial 
system which is not yet run on market lines, preventing the 
development of indirect policy instruments essential for 
macroeconomic control in the context of a market economy. 
Secondly, and the focus of this paper, the existence of a large 
number of state owned enterprises (SOEs), many of which being 
loss making. China has more than 100,000 state run companies, 
employing approximately two thirds of the urban workforce. It is 
widely believed that more than half of these state sector firms are 
currently making losses and that this proportion is rising. 
Government concerns about creating mass unemployment in the 
cities and major social unrest, has resulted in large SOEs being 
heavily subsidised as well as being able to gain access to soft 
credit. As a result the state banks, despite measures taken in 
1994 to encourage them to lend on commercial lines and the 
creation of three development banks exclusively responsible for 
policy lending1 from 1995, were, in reality, under pressure to keep 
extending credit to large state firms and on favourable terms2. The 
result of this is an accumulation by the banks of unpaid debts 
which is undermining the financial system. Although the Chinese 
may save a great deal, a significant proportion of this is not being 
used in an optimum way. With few alternative ways of saving 
open to them, most Chinese save with the state banks. 
Approximately 70% of bank loans to industry still go to the state
1. INTRODUCTION
1 The State Development Bank of China, the Export-Import Bank, and the 
Agricultural Development Bank of China.
2 At a negative real interest rate.
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sector, which produces less than a third of industrial output, 
while the dynamic non state sector, producing the remaining two 
thirds of industrial output, finds access to such loans more 
difficult and the terms less favourable. The pressure on the 
government to continually provide more credit to state run firms 
also means that China remains vulnerable to bouts of inflation.
The inflationary pressure arising in 1992/93 led to a renewed 
phase of macroeconomic austerity, from July 1993, with the 
introduction of a 16 point austerity program announced by the 
Vice Premier Zhu Rongji, to restore order to the economy. This 
involved pursuing deflationary policies largely through controls on 
state investment via credit rationing and administered price 
controls, to lower economic growth and so reverse the rapid 
increase in prices. However this contributed to the SOEs facing 
tight credit, substantial losses and indebtedness, both to the 
banks and to each other (the triangular debt problem). By 1996, 
after almost three years of austerity, the SOEs were in a further 
weakened position, with unexpectedly large losses culminating in 
considerable state funding and extension of credit to the large 
SOEs by the state banks. During the first six months of 1996, for 
every dollar China's industrial enterprises made in profit only one 
cent came from state enterprises. The lack of an apparent hard 
budget constraint has contributed to this relatively poor 
performance, with managers being unconcerned at rising losses 
and the cost of scarce credit. The further growth in the 
indebtedness of the state enterprise sector is proving to be of 
considerable concern. Estimates have been made that the 
accumulated loans made by the state bank sector to loss making 
state owned industrial enterprises, as at the end of 1995, could be 
as much as the equivalent of 10% of GDP or even more. Some 
state banks have poorly performing loans equivalent to 25% or 
more than the value of their assets. While the level of 
indebtedness seems now to be stabilising, the situation is forcing
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the restructuring of the state enterprise sector. A major challenge 
facing China during the remainder of the 1990s will be the need to 
accelerate the movement towards restructuring of SOEs, while 
minimising its impact upon unemployment.
The optimism about SOE reform and restructuring from a new 
phase of reform begun in 1993 has now been questioned, given 
this recent expansion of subsidies and credit to the SOE sector. 
However a number of ad hoc measures are being implemented to 
tackle the problem of the poorly performing SOEs. These include 
corporatisation and commercialisation of the large scale 
enterprises, and the auctioning, leasing and merging of small and 
medium sized enterprises. In particular, through gradual 
corporatisation of the large SOEs the Chinese authorities plan to 
separate government administration from enterprise management. 
Based upon the recently enacted Company Law of 1994, the 
rights of enterprises were to be safeguarded while the 
responsibility of the state was to be limited. However the 
principle of state ownership is to be maintained. A key element of 
state enterprise reform will also involve divesting from them the 
provision of subsidised housing, social security, health care and 
other social benefits.
Complicating the SOE dilemma for the Chinese authorities are 
two other mounting pressures, one from inside China and the 
other from outside. Inside pressure in the form of growing income 
disparities between social strata and geographical regions 
threatens to fuel social unrest. Many of the loss making 
government enterprises are in the poor provincial areas, where 
there closure would only exacerbate the existing income disparity. 
At the same time, China is experiencing outside pressure as its 
trading partners demand greater access to its markets as the price 
for its long delayed entry into the WTO. The increased 
competition generated could prove to be fatal for many
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inefficient, capital and technology short SOEs, and even some of 
the profitable ones.
On the positive side the non state sector is growing very 
rapidly, resulting in the SOEs share of industrial production and 
employment having fallen steadily. Some forecasters suggest that 
the number employed by state industries fell by 10 million in the 
last year alone.3 The growth of private firms along with the quasi 
private township and village enterprises (TVEs) may mean that 
the withering of the state sector can be managed smoothly. This in 
turn should allow more resources to be gradually shifted to the 
non state sector, thereby increasing China's further potential for 
growth.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 a 
review of developments in the industrial sector and the recent 
performance of the SOEs is conducted. Section 3 identifies the 
major reform measures which have been advanced to improve the 
performance of the SOEs. Section 4 briefly identifies other SOE 
reform related measures in the areas of employment, social 
security and housing. Section 5 conducts a review of the 
privatisation experience and measures taken in other transition 
economies in regard to their SOEs, and identifies their potential 
applicability to China. Finally section 6 presents a summary of 
the major conclusions to be derived from this paper.
2. INDUSTRIAL SECTOR AND SOE PERFORMANCE
The economic progress of the Chinese economy has been truly 
remarkable. Since reform began in 1978 the economy had 
quadrupled in size by 1995, and is expected to increase by a 
further 50% by the end of the decade. The major engine for this 
growth is to be found from the extensive investment in the 
industrial sector, and the opening up of the economy to 
international trade and investment. However despite this
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stunning and sustained economic success for China as a whole, a 
number of unresolved legacies remain to be overcome from the 
country's "growing out of the plan"3. Two crucial and inter­
related problems have arisen from this process and are in urgent 
need of attention by the authorities. Firstly there is the need to 
put the financial sector on a commercial footing and to develop 
indirect policy instruments, such as that of the interest rate, as a 
means of conducting macroeconomic control within the context of 
a market oriented economy. Secondly, as with other reforming 
socialist economies such as India and Vietnam, there is a pressing 
need to restructure the country's SOEs. Although the relative size 
of the SOE sector in the Chinese economy has declined sharply 
since the onset of reforms in the late 1980s, it still remains 
important in the economy. In 1978, about 78% of the gross value 
of industrial output was accounted for by SOEs, declining 
significantly to around 31% by 1995 ( see Table 1). Despite this 
the SOE sector's contribution to total output remains large, and it 
employs about two-thirds of China's 170 million strong urban 
workforce (Figure 1). In addition, the SOE sector is closely linked 
to the banking system through the credit plan, pre-empting over 
two thirds of total domestic credit4. It also remains important in 
budgetary operations, contributing directly to about one fourth of 
total revenue and receiving operating subsidies amounting to two 
thirds of the overall budget deficit.
The overall financial performance of the SOE sector, however, 
remains weak. Although the gross profits of SOEs rebounded 
markedly in 1992-93 with the strong performance of the economy, 
the losses of some SOEs have continued at a very high level. A
3 This description of China’s development has been taken from Naughton 
(1996)
4 This figure has been put as high as 80-90% by other sources.
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Table 1
Industrial Production by Ownership of Enterprises (%)
1978 1989 1995
S ta te 78.0 56.1 30.7
C ollective 22.0 35.7 43.2
Private / Individual 0 4.8 12.5
Joint Venture/Foreign 0 3.4 13.6
Source: China Statistical Publishing House
Figure 1
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sectoral disaggregation of losses during the early 1990s suggests 
that they were about equally distributed among the industrial, 
foreign trade and commerce, and grain sectors. In the industrial 
sector, about one half of the losses were concentrated in the coal 
and oil industries alone. Following the adoption of new 
accounting standards in early 1994, it was estimated that about 
one half of all SOEs were incurring losses. Even on official figures, 
the percentage of enterprises which lose money rose from 27% in 
1990 to 43% in 1995, and, for the first time ever, the state sector 
as a whole swung into a small loss during the first three months of 
1996 and this did not include the subsidies provided by 
government. In the past SOE losses have been covered about 
equally through budgetary subsidies and bank loans, with the 
latter having a consequentially detrimental effect upon the 
portfolio quality and capital structure of the state banking 
system.
The loss making SOEs therefore represent a sizeable drain 
upon government revenue and domestic saving, and present a 
significant obstacle to the future reform and health of the 
economy. For example the World Bank estimated that China 
subsidised its SOEs to the tune of US$14.4 billion in 1993, 
against a US$7-8 billion budget deficit that year. The more recent 
performance of the SOEs indicates that this deterioration is 
continuing, suggesting an urgent need for attention by the 
authorities, and that China's state sector is in worse shape now 
than at any time in its 18 years of economic reform. The weakness 
of the state sector has been further compounded by the austerity 
program in effect since July 1993 arising from the break neck 
growth of output in 1992 and 1993, initiated by Deng Xiaoping's 
famous visit to the coastal provinces in early 1992, and the 
consequential build up of inflation within the economy (see Table 
2). The austerity measures involved controls on state investment
7
Table 2
GDP Growth and Inflation 1990-97










Source: China Statistical Yearbook
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via credit rationing and administered price controls. By 1996 a 
soft landing had been achieved, with inflation less than GDP 
growth for the first time since 1993. Charing the austerity period, 
however, sluggish domestic demand, low levels of new investment 
and a slump in exports hit Chinese companies hard. One sign of 
this pain has been the falling ratio of industrial sales to output, a 
proxy for gauging stock levels (see Figure 2). A falling ratio 
implies that stocks of goods are accumulating. The problem was 
made worse by the state owned firms that maintained production 
and employment while accumulating losses or experiencing 
reduced profits. The SOEs were able to do this despite tight 
credit policies, because the country's state owned commercial 
banks were called upon to increase fixed investment loans to large 
state enterprises. By, for example, an inflation adjusted 18% in
1995. The more dynamic non state sector, meanwhile, found its 
access to credit increasingly more difficult with its share of 
commercial bank loans plunging by a real 28% in 1995. Hence 
despite the austerity measures, credit remained plentiful for the 
economy's least efficient sector. The government is anticipating 
channelling a further 71.5% of fixed asset investment, US$305 
billion, into state enterprises in 1997. This has led many 
economists to question the Chinese authorities' willingness to 
reform the SOEs and to wean them off subsidies and easy credit.
For some time China has tried to simply grow out of the SOE 
problem, by letting overall GDP expansion, and a relatively faster 
growth rate of the nonstate sector, reduce the size of the state 
sector (see Table 3). From 78% in 1978 the contribution of China's 
118,000 SOEs has shrunk rapidly, accounting for under a third of 
industrial output by 1995. Picking up the slack is the non state 
sector which is increasingly absorbing the roughly 15% of the 
urban work force which the government concedes is superfluous. 
Playing a leading role in the nonstate sector is that of the 
collective enterprises, consisting of both urban and rural
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enterprises. The collective sector has seen its share of industrial 
output increase from 22% in 1978 to 43% in 1995. There has been 
a particularly impressive growth of the rural enterprises, the so 
called TVEs. In 1978 some 1.52 million TVEs employed 28.3 
million workers, which expanded dramatically to 25 million TVEs 
employing 120 million workers by 1994. Unlike the SOEs they are: 
small in size, averaging about 5 workers each; sufficiently nimble 
enough to respond to market changes in a way which the SOEs 
cannot; and are subject to hard budget constraints. Despite 
ambiguous property rights, they have been a remarkable and 
somewhat unanticipated successful consequence of China's 
economic reforms. Table 4 indicates that the productivity 
performance of the collective sector, and most notably the TVEs, 
has been noticeably superior to that of the state sector. In 
addition many thousands of private companies, both domestic 
and foreign owned, and joint ventures have also developed, and 
they now account for a little over 25% of industrial output5. The 
impressive growth of this sector is likely to be maintained, 
although the extent of this will be dependent upon its access to 
scarce financial resources. Yet despite these developments the 
SOEs still consume a far greater share of scarce state financial 
resources than those in the non state sector, approximately three 
quarters of state industrial investment. As a consequence the 
government is increasingly investing scarce resources in declining 
industries, which will ultimately contribute to a decline in 
economic growth should this remain unchanged.
5 The ‘other’ category in Table 3.
Table 3
Real Gross Value of Industrial Production (GVIO) 1990-95
GVIO
T o tal





1990 5.2 2.7 6.2 47.4
1991 12.8 7.6 17.3 40.7
1992 21.4 13.1 32.9 50.6
1993 23.8 9.1 39.9 59.5
1994 21.6 2.1 30.5 43.5
1995 16.0 9.0 25.0 30.0
e GVIO of private, foreign invested and other enterprises. 
Source: State Statistical Bureau
Table 4
Estimated Rates of Annual Productivity Growth in Chinese 
Industry (% change)
1980-84 1984-88 1988-92
A. Total Factor Productivity
State sector 1.8 3.0 2.5a
Collective sector
Urban and township 3.4 5.9 4.9a
To w nship-V  illage 7 .3a 6.6a 6.9a
B Labour Productivity (real terms)
State sector 3.8 6.2 4.7
Collective sector
Urban and township 8.6 7.0 13.8
Tow nship-V illage 5.8 14.4 17.7
a Preliminary results.
Sources: Taken from Jefferson and Rawski (1994), p.56.
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Although many reformers have recommended widespread 
bankruptcies or privatisation of the SOEs, this could create major 
social unrest and the government has already rejected large scale 
privatisation. Indeed the government still views the state owned 
sector as the backbone of the economy. With seven of every 10 
Chinese industrial workers employed in state enterprises, over 
100 million workers, the potential fall out from extensive 
bankruptcy would be immense. In many areas they are the sole 
employers and providers of social services, from housing to 
transport to health care and education. This would also have 
adverse consequences for already widening regional income 
disparities. Thus, even if sustaining the loss makers among them 
with loans is inflationary and wasteful, the alternative of mass 
shutdown could be a recipe for mass social unrest. More recently 
a middle ground has emerged, described as to "grasp the large 
and sacrifice the small". This involves a three pronged approach 
which will essentially involve leasing, selling or closing small 
failing companies, restructuring the robust ones, and sustaining 
with state funds those enterprises of national importance6. These 
alternative models and their application in China is discussed in 
the following section.
The continuing weakness of SOE performance has arisen from 
a number of factors. Administrative control on the prices of key 
products such as coal, oil, grain, and other essential products. 
With the recent further liberalisation of prices, losses because of 
this are likely to be greatly reduced. A more important reason has 
been the organisational structure of the SOEs, which is 
characterised by insufficient managerial autonomy and 
accountability, the lack of hard budget constraints, rigidities in 
wages and employment, overstaffing (many economists believe 
that SOEs have about a third more employees than they require),
6 The so called ‘pillar industries’ as described by Premier Li Peng.
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a heavy burden of social benefits for their workers (housing, 
education, health and pensions) and the use of obsolescent 
technology. In a number of these areas progress has been made, 
but the recent experience of 1996 in which the SOEs were 
extended easy credit by the commercial state banks and further 
subsidies by the government undermines the attainment of 
managerial accountability and the credible imposition of a hard 
budget constraint. It also makes it impossible to develop indirect 
policy instruments operating through financial markets as a 
means of attaining macroeconomic control in a market oriented 
economy. For example, in 1995 when the government twice raised 
interest rates in an attempt to reduce the demand for loans, this 
had little effect on the SOEs. The linkage between the SOEs and 
the commercial state banks needs to be broken, or else further 
reform will be impossible. There is considerable resistance to such 
a development. For example by the end of 1996 the Chinese 
authorities had to retreat from transforming large scale state 
enterprises, mostly because their managers resisted efforts at 
accountability. The government had planned to corporatise 100 
large scale enterprises by converting them into shareholding or 
limited liability companies. As it turned out, more than 80 
preferred the form of solely state owned enterprises, a far cry 
from the goal of the experiment. With easy access to credit and 
little accountability this is a much easier option for an SOE 
manager.
Such problems make reform in other key sectors, such as the 
financial sector, much more difficult. State industry owes the 
state banking system a great deal of money. For a start, the 5 
trillion yuan (US$600 billion) of bank loans outstanding in China, 
nine-tenths of it to state industry, account for an unusually high 
proportion of all financing, equivalent to about 70% of GDP. 
China has only one private bank, and no meaningful capital 
markets, hence the job of financing investment rests almost wholly
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with the state banks. The Chinese save the equivalent of oVer 40% 
of GDP, nearly all of which is deposited with state banks because 
of the lack at present of alternatives. The stockmarket still 
remains very small. As much as nine-tenths of bank loans go to 
the state sector, hence domestic savings are not being used most 
efficiently. Household and corporate savings are drawn off in the 
prosperous coastal areas and, through the state credit plan, 
recycled to those parts of the country to support relatively 
inefficient SOEs. The money lent by banks to the state sector has 
risen, from 500 billion yuan (US$86 billion) at the end of 1993 to 
over 1 trillion yuan (US$120 billion) by the end of 1996. 
Conservative estimates put the increase in bad debts each year at 
50-60 billion yuan, with total bad debts amounting to more than 
25% of the banks' assets. In addition to SOE debt to the state 
banks there is also SOE debts to other SOEs. Such debts between 
the SOEs the government and the state banks is known as 
triangular debt. This could amount to over 800 billion yuan by the 
end of 1996.
It is clear from the discussion in this section the extent of the 
task facing the authorities. However further reform of the 
economy, and the movement towards a market economy, requires 
action to be taken in the area of loss making SOEs and the 
financial sector. Should such reforms not be forthcoming there will 
be an inevitable slow down in the growth of the economy, a loss 
of jobs and the development of social unrest which the authorities 
all along have been concerned with avoiding.
3. REFORMING THE STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES 
Enterprise reforms prior to 1993
Until reforms were initiated, the SOEs had little autonomy. Their 
production, pricing, and investment decisions were subject to the 
planning process, they transferred all surplus funds to the state
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budget, and they relied on the budget for subsidies to cover losses 
and grants for investment. Few incentives were available to 
workers or management, wages were set by centrally determined 
scales, and the managers' main responsibility was to fulfill 
production quotas. Early reforms aimed to increase enterprise 
autonomy and accountability. In this regard the issuance of the 
"Provisional Regulations on the Enlargement of Autonomy of 
State Industrial Enterprises" in 1984 represented an important 
step. These regulations permitted an increase in autonomy for 
above target output in terms of price setting, output sales, and 
input purchases. Also, in 1984-85, an enterprise income tax on 
SOEs was introduced, and these tax payments replaced profit 
remittances as the main source of fiscal revenue from enterprises. 
Enterprises were allowed to retain most of their after tax profits 
and their depreciation funds. In 1986 the Contract Responsibility 
System (CRS) was introduced, for medium sized and larger SOEs. 
Under this targets were specified for the enterprise over a three or 
four year period for its performance in terms of output, profit 
remittances and taxes to the government. An enterprise's income 
tax liability under the CRS was determined by the provisions of 
the enterprise's contract instead of by law, leading to a strong 
element of bargaining in the fiscal process. The first generation of 
these contracts, signed by at least 90% of the SOEs, was in place 
by 1988. To accompany these changes, a bankruptcy law was 
enacted in 1986 and became effective in 1988, but until recently it 
was hardly used against SOEs. In 1988 the authorities also 
enacted an Enterprise Law, which seeked to transform the SOEs 
into fully autonomous legal entities responsible for their own 
profits and losses. In July 1992, the implementing regulations of 
the Enterprise Law of 1988, entitled "Regulations on 
Transforming the Operating Mechanisms of SOEs", were issued 
by the State Council. These regulations explicitly provided for non 
interference by the government in the operations of the
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enterprises, which were endowed with a set of 14 rights (see 
below), including the right to decide what to produce and how to 
price and market their products, how to invest their funds, the 
right to hire and fire workers and to decide on wage policy, with 
the objective of transforming the SOEs into autonomous legal 
entities responsible for their own profits and losses. Inefficient 
and loss making ones were to be reconstructed or closed down in 
accordance with the Bankruptcy Law. The role of the state as 
owner of the enterprises is delegated to the State Asset 
Management Bureau. Enterprises had, in summary, the right to 
enjoy the following:
• to make production and business decisions
• to set their own prices
• to market their own products
• to purchase materials
• to import and export
• to make investment decisions
• to decide on the use of retained earnings
• to dispose of assets in accordance with production 
requirements
• to form partnerships and mergers
• to assign labour
• to have personnel management
• to set wages and bonuses
• to determine internal organisations
• to refuse arbitrary levies and charges
Although the initial impact of these reforms was a recovery in 
the output of SOEs, price controls persisted, production quotas 
for sale to the state remained part of the contracts, the SOEs had 
access to certain amounts of cheap raw materials, credit was 
readily available for investment or working capital, the budget
16
continued to provide support for loss-making enterprises, and 
little advantage was taken of reforms to wage and employment 
practices. In short the SOEs continued to face a soft budget 
constraint.
The incompleteness of the reforms jeopardised macroeconomic 
management, with SOEs contributing to the rapid rate of credit 
expansion in the late 1980s and early 1990s, reflecting mounting 
demands on the state budget to cover enterprise losses, low 
revenue buoyancy, the accumulation of large inventories of 
unmarketable products (either because of excess production or 
low quality), and the associated growth of inter-enterprise 
arrears. To address these problems, the authorities during 1991 
announced some 20 measures, 12 of which were to improve the 
operations and external environment of the SOEs, and the others 
were aimed at facilitating the operation of market forces on the 
SOEs. Some measures, such as reducing mandatory planning, 
were further steps toward a market economy, but others, such as 
preferential access to credit and tax concessions, continued 
existing interventionist policies. Indeed, during the rectification 
program of 1988 and 1989, a large number of SOEs were given 
preferential access to credit and raw materials under a "mutual 
pledge" or "double guarantee" system, which obliged them to 
deliver specified amounts of output to the state.
Another key area of enterprise reform was aimed at changing 
the governance structure, accounting procedures and ownership 
rights, in addition to the previously mentioned management 
rights, of SOEs, to make them more appropriate in the context of 
a market economy. A number of experiments in this regard were 
applied primarily to large SOEs:
1. reforms establishing the formation of "enterprise groups" 
along the lines of the Japanese keiretsus, but more closely so to 
that of the South Korean chaebols, integrated through a 
parent-subsidiary relationship. Some of these groups have
17
been required to take over loss making enterprises to help 
rationalise their operations,
2. another development in the restructuring of SOEs involved the 
"grafting" of SOEs with foreign investment. In such an 
arrangement, an SOE would typically invite foreign 
participation in certain lines of production, and a joint 
venture would be formed, under which the SOE would 
provide the land, buildings, and labour, and the foreign 
partner the equipment, technology and marketing expertise. 
This was later increasingly used by the Chinese authorities as 
a means of foreign investors gaining access to the Chinese 
market,
3. another experiment in reforming the governance structure of 
enterprises was the introduction of corporate forms of 
ownership and management. Provisions for limited liability 
private companies were introduced in 1990, and the 
shareholding experiment was formally sanctioned for SOEs. In 
late 1990, stock exchanges were established in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen, although provisional regulations on the issuance of 
securities were made public by the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
municipal governments only in 1992.
In addition reforms of the labour and employment system were 
also initiated to provide for greater flexibility at the enterprise 
level in terms of worker selection, task definition and wages. 
Reform in terms of the social benefits system, including 
unemployment benefits, pensions, and health care, aimed at 
establishing pooled benefits schemes and a separation of the 
provision of benefits from specific enterprises were also begun. 
Reforms aimed at commercialising the housing market have also 
been recently launched. Some SOEs have separated service 
activities from enterprise operations, creating autonomous units 
that are responsible for their own profits and losses. Other
18
reforms during this period affecting SOEs have included price 
liberalisation, the reduction of the scope of the mandatory plans, 
the introduction of markets for land use rights, the liberalisation 
of the foreign exchange market, the opening of new sectors and 
regions to foreign trade and investment, and the deepening of 
financial markets.
Despite the numerous experiments with SOE reforms in the 
1980s their performance remained weak, with about one third of 
SOEs estimated to be making losses, and another one third were 
breaking even. Autonomy and financial accountability remained 
weak. SOEs still operated predominantly under the direct 
supervision of the central or local governments. The retrenchment 
period of the late 1980s and early 1990s highlighted the weakness 
of the SOEs sector. However beginning in 1991, several large 
SOEs were transformed into joint stock companies and listed 
their shares on both domestic and international stock exchanges. 
This was to be given further impetus with reforms after 1993.
A new phase o f SOE reform after 1993
The thrust of the new phase of reforms is to change enterprise 
governance, with the objective of establishing a modem enterprise 
sector consistent with the attainment of a socialist market 
economy as proclaimed by the Chinese authorities in October
1992. This aim is to be achieved through the corporatisation of 
SOEs, that is, the conversion of SOEs into shareholding 
companies through the implementation of a new Company Law 
enacted in December 1993 and which became effective in July 
1994. The new companies will be vested with a corporate 
governance structure that generally follows international practice. 
Through this, the authorities aim to achieve a separation of the 
ownership functions of the state from the management of the
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enterprises, within a framework of greater autonomy and 
accountability. Specifically, the new framework will:
1. clarify the rights of enterprises as legal entities entitled to 
make decisions concerning assets entrusted to them by owners 
and investors,
2. separate government ministries and departments from 
enterprise management to eliminate government interference in 
enterprise management,
3. relieve SOEs of the obligation to provide social services while 
expanding the government's role in the provision of these 
services,
4. establish market based relations between enterprises, so as to 
avoid the recurrent accumulation of inter-enterprise debt,
5. reduce the government's control over wage and employment 
policies while limiting its role in this sphere to a supervisory 
one.
In this new framework, a system for the management of state 
owned assets by state holding companies, state asset 
management companies, and enterprise groups would be 
introduced. To permit enterprises in the new system to function 
effectively, supporting measures were to be introduced, including 
the implementation of Company Law, the enactment of a national 
securities law, the implementation of a new accounting system, 
and the development of factor markets. In addition, to support 
enterprise reform, the authorities set up in 1994 a fund of Yuan 7 
billion designated for debt repayment.
In early 1994, shortly after the Third Plenum of the 14th 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in November
1993, the government launched a pilot project, or experiment, for 
the establishment of a modem enterprise system. This project 
involved 10,000 medium sized and large SOEs in a program that
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included asset valuation, the granting of financial autonomy, and 
the adoption of a new accounting system. Of these, 1,000 
enterprises, deemed to be critical to the economy, were selected 
for an experiment that would delegate to asset management firms 
the authority to oversee the management of these enterprises' 
assets with the objective of increasing their value over time. 
Another 100 enterprises were to become corporatised and thereby 
to participate in an expansion of the existing shareholding 
system. Finally, ten major cities, later increased to eighteen, were 
selected for a comprehensive enterprise reform program: including 
pension pooling; staff lay-off and bankruptcies. The whole 
project was initially expected to take two to three years to 
complete. The medium term goal of such reform was to transform 
most SOEs into autonomous, competitive, legal entities fully 
accountable for their profits and losses, and in the process of 
which to create a level playing field for all enterprises.
While the new phase of enterprise reform places a heavy 
emphasis on the maintenance of public ownership as the 
cornerstone of the economy, it does represent a fundamental 
change in the concept of ownership of SOEs. A distinction was to 
be drawn between the ownership of an enterprise and its 
management, the rights of ownership are circumscribed by law, 
and enterprises are regarded as legal entities with their own rights 
and responsibilities. Such a clarification of the concept of 
ownership was seen as being necessary for a fundamental 
restructuring of the SOEs. This, in conjunction with the 
implementation of a standardised accounting system, would lay 
the foundations for the possibility of privatisation at a later date. 
In addition, the predominance of public ownership in this new 
ownership system was to be confined to certain strategic sectors 
of the economy. Considerable diversification in the ownership 
structure of the Chinese economy as a whole over a number of 
years has taken place. This has occurred through the promotion of
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a dynamic, collectively owned enterprise sector, joint ventures, 
foreign funded enterprises, private and individually owned 
businesses, the shareholding or corporatisation experiments, the 
divestiture by SOEs of some of their ancillary activities by selling 
or leasing part of enterprise assets to individuals or groups of 
individuals, and the divestiture by the state of enterprises 
themselves. The Company Law of 1994 therefore represented a 
major step in the SOE reform process, enabling for the first time a 
unified legal framework for the establishment and operation of 
companies as independent identities.
Despite these developments in ownership structure the 
message from the government remains clear, however, that reform 
of the state sector will have clear limits. Public ownership of the 
largest state firms will remain sacrosanct and bankruptcies will be 
isolated. As reiterated at the National People's Congress in 
March 1996, the state sector will remain the backbone of the 
economy. Under the Ninth Five Year Plan (1996-2000) reform of 
the state sector is seen as being a top priority, and the State 
Commission for Restructuring the Economy (SCRES) has 
indicated that reform of the Chinese economy will lead to the loss 
of 18 million jobs at state owned firms during the period of it.
In the remainder of this section a number of experiments 
relating to improving the performance of the SOEs will be 
discussed. These will focus upon: corporatisation, the 
establishment of enterprise groups; approaches to improving the 
performance of small and medium sized SOEs, approaches to 
loss making enterprises.
Corporatisation
The major thrust of SOE reforms has been to focus on their 
corporatisation and commercialisation, with the objective of 
separating government administration from enterprise
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management. In this regard the shareholding system is an 
important experiment in enterprise reform that has major 
ramifications for the ownership structure of enterprises and has 
received widespread interest. Under this system, enterprises are 
allowed to restructure themselves into limited liability companies 
by issuing shares. The shareholding system (or corporatisation) 
provides for a clear separation between the ownership and 
management of the enterprises and is therefore a way of 
restructuring the relationship between the government and the 
enterprises under its control. Several thousand enterprises are 
participating in this exercise. For example by the end of 1993 
there were about 11,600 of such companies in China, of which 
8,300 were limited liability companies and 3,300 were joint stock 
companies. All of these companies can apply for listing in the 
country's two stock exchanges of Shanghai and Shenzhen. The 
authorities, however, do not regard the conversion of SOEs into 
shareholding companies as "privatisation". Instead they see this 
as a means of raising funds for restructuring and of introducing a 
more effective management system, while the state retains a 
significant ownership share and ultimate control over companies. 
The development of the shareholding system has been boosted by 
the establishment of stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen, 
to list the shares of approved joint stock companies. These are 
shareholding companies that issue shares to the general public 
and that may apply for listing on the two stock exchanges. In the 
restructuring, the proportion of the shares belonging to the state, 
municipality, or township is determined by an appraisal 
company according to the net value of the assets in the enterprise 
accruing to the state, municipality or township.
With regard to the extent of state participation in shareholding 
companies, four levels of government ownership were envisaged:
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1. in certain priority sectors, defined as those characterised by 
market failures or that produced goods deemed to be of 
national strategic significance, enterprises will remain wholly 
owned by the government,
2. the second level will consist of enterprises with majority 
government ownership.,
3. the third level will comprise enterprises with minority 
shareholding by the government,
4. finally, some small enterprises engaged primarily in 
commercial activities will be auctioned or leased to 
individuals, with the state not being represented in the 
ownership structure.
After an enterprise has been turned into a shareholding 
company, the state's position as the sole owner will disappear in 
cases 2, 3 and 4.. As one among many owners with equity rights, 
the state will only participate in the decision making to the extent 
of its representation. The authorities envisage that, even in 
enterprises in which the state is the majority shareholder, the 
effective separation of ownership from management will be 
achieved by requiring the government act according to the statutes 
of the new company/enterprise law.
Considerable progress was made during 1993 and in 1994 
with the new Company Law, in extending and formalising the 
shareholding system. Although experiments with the issuance of 
stocks as a means of raising capital began in the early 1980s, 
these stocks had no legal standing and, hence, were restricted in 
terms of ownership rights and transferability. Since 1990, a 
number of important measures have been taken to legalise the 
corporate form of enterprises and the issuance of stock, leading 
to, as mentioned above, the establishment of stock exchanges in
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Shanghai and Shenzhen7. The 1994 Company Law provided a 
legal and unified basis for the establishment and operations of 
companies in China. Under it two forms of companies may be 
established, a limited liability company and a joint stock 
company. Specifically, the law covers all forms of ownership — 
private, public and FFEs and; does not provide for a mandatory 
m inim um  state shareholding in a company; eliminates the 
distinction between state held, corporate owned and individual 
private person shares; specifies a framework of corporate 
governance in the form of a board of directors and board of 
supervisors; prohibits government officials from serving as 
company directors, supervisors, or general managers; stipulates 
minimum capital requirements for various types of companies; 
and clearly defines conditions for share transfer or sale. Also, it 
outlines procedures for corporate mergers, bankruptcy, and the 
liquidation of companies.
While the emergence of joint stock companies and equity 
markets is still of limited significance from an economic 
standpoint, they do represent a major change in the ideological 
framework of reforms in China. They are an important constituent 
part of a broader process of ownership change, and the growth of 
the stock exchanges have provided an important impetus for new 
accounting standards to replace the existing accounting standards 
which were not adequate to support public trading in shares. In 
addition they are no longer seen as being at odds with the 
institutional underpinnings of a "socialist" economy, since there 
will still be the predominance of public ownership. At first, the 
shares of the companies listed on the stock exchanges were issued 
only to domestic residents (A shares). Since 1991, however, some
7 A decision was taken in 1993 to extend the right to list shares of joint stock 
companies to cities other than Shanghai and Shenzhen.
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companies have been permitted to issue B shares8, denominated 
in local currency, but purchased by foreigners with payment in 
foreign exchange. Foreign investors are guaranteed convertibility 
of their investment and earnings into foreign exchange at the swap 
market rate. Indeed some SOEs have been listed on stock 
exchanges overseas.
At the end of 1993, as part of the SOE reform process, a 
decision was made to select a batch of 100 large state enterprises, 
from among the 1000 or so large enterprises that have a 
significant bearing on the economy, for conversion to limited 
liability joint stock companies, Primary ownership would remain 
with the state, but with corporate organisation otherwise 
completely restructured. The pilot program was started in 1995 
with a further 300 enterprises due to join in 1996. This indicated 
that the authorities were moving in the direction of a batch by 
batch commercialisation of firms, which could potentially be 
followed by privatisation if and when political constraints 
allowed.
A number of advantages arising from this shareholding 
arrangement were seen by the authorities:
1. it facilitated the separation of government ownership from 
management,
2. it facilitated the mobilisation and rational allocation of 
financial resources,
3. it facilitated the provision of greater financial and decision 
making autonomy, so that enterprises could become more 
efficient and respond dynamically to changing market 
opportunities.
8 In addition, and more recently, there are the so called ‘red chip’ shares and H 
shares. The former are shares of mainland China owned enterprises listed on 
the Hong Kong stock exchange, while the latter are the shares of subsidiaries 
of mainland China owned enterprises listed on the Hong Kong stock 
exchange and based in Hong Kong.
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While the major incentive from the perspective of enterprises 
to list on the stock exchanges is the ability to raise equity funds 
for restructuring and upgrading, over the longer run the greater 
discipline on enterprise management that is likely to result from 
the scrutiny that listed companies are subject to from both 
shareholders and investors will be more significant. This is 
particularly the case with those enterprises that are listed abroad, 
where public disclosure requirements are more stringent, and the 
scrutiny from institutional investors more rigorous. Nevertheless, 
the transformation of enterprises into corporations cannot, alone, 
ensure greater operational efficiency or profitability. 
Complementary and supplementary changes in other areas are 
essential to create a competitive environment for SOEs, such as 
the enforcement of a hard budget constraint through the 
commercialisation of the banking sector and a wider application 
of the Bankruptcy Law to non profitable enterprises. In addition 
it is essential to further liberalise prices and develop competitive 
markets for goods and factors of production. In this sense, the 
supporting changes that are under way in the areas of taxation, 
banking, housing markets, and the provision of social security are 
at least as important for bringing about a lasting improvement in 
SOE performance as the process of corporatisation itself.
Several problems still remain to be resolved with respect to 
such an enterprise experiment. The first concerns the 
establishment of a strong legal framework governing the issuance 
and trading of shares. Second, asset valuation and accounting 
practices need to be standardised across enterprises. Third the 
pace of reform of the social security system needs to be quickened 
to enable fundamental restructuring of the SOE sector. Fourth, 
financial sector reforms need to be accelerated so that, unlike in
1996, banks can no longer be prevailed upon by central and local 
authorities to grant loans to uncreditworthy enterprises, which, in
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turn, has important implications for hardening enterprise budget 
constraints. Finally, some questions remain on whether a true 
separation of the state's role as an owner and as a manager can 
be achieved as long as the majority, or even the largest minority of 
shareholders, are agents of the state. In addition the 
corporatisation reforms have been met by much resistance by SOE 
managers, especially over the issue of accountability. The initial 
results from the batch of 100 large SOEs to be corporatised has 
been very disappointing. The intention of the Chinese authorities 
was to corporatise these enterprises by converting them into 
shareholding or limited liability companies by the end of 1996. As 
it turned out, however, more than 80 of them preferred the form 
of solely state owned enterprises, and continued financial 
support from the state, a far cry from the goal of the trial. This is 
perhaps not surprising given the easing of access to credit for 
"pillar industries" through the state banking system which 
occurred in 1996, without the need for accountability by managers 
to shareholders.
Enterprise groups
Another experiment that is being encouraged is the formation of 
large enterprise groups, with the aim of rationalising the industrial 
structure by taking advantage of economies of scale and 
promoting the optimum use of resources. In China each locality 
was encouraged to be fully self-reliant during the pre-reform 
period. Furthermore, enterprises within one branch of an industry 
were normally not allowed to diversify into related fields. As a 
result, from a national perspective, there is much duplication, a 
lack of specialisation, and strong local barriers to inter-regional 
trade. The aim of the authorities is to break down the 
departmental, regional, and ownership barriers in the economy
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and create large conglomerates that are efficient and 
internationally competitive.
Several hundred "enterprise groups" were formed in the early 
1990s, and a review concluded that 431 of these qualified as 
genuine enterprise groups, with effective control exerted directly 
over branch plants by a large core firm, thus breaking down the 
bureaucratic and administrative barriers that had made 
enterprises appendages of the bureaucratic apparatus. Many of 
these groups have diversified interests, and often hold foreign 
trade rights. Indeed, the Chinese government designated 100 of 
these enterprise groups to receive government support. The stated 
objective is to create a nucleus of large corporate groups like the 
Japanese keiretsu or Korean chaebol. These groups will have 
diversified production interests and substantial financial depth, 
and will be encouraged to operate internationally. These firms 
operate with substantial autonomy, sometimes aided by political 
patronage ties with top politicians and military figures. They can 
be clearly distinguished from limited experiments with enterprise 
groups and "horizontal linkages" in the 1980s, as the new 
enterprise groups of the 1990s seem to be genuine corporations 
with substantial autonomy and international outlook.
In the past two years the government has selected 55 large 
enterprise groups for restructuring to strengthen the role of the 
parent or core enterprise within each group, particularly its 
management of the subsidiary enterprises. Preferential treatment 
such as trading rights or the right to diversify into other fields of 
activity are being provided to these enterprise groups, to 
encourage their development into competitive conglomerates. 
Since there is much duplication in Chinese industry, with 
hundreds of inefficient small factories often making the same 
things, this does make economic sense. In this regard lessons can 
be learned from the Japanese keiretsu system, in which individual 
Japanese companies, often with their own stockmarket listings,
29
are linked together through cross shareholdings. At the core is a 
bank which, in conjunction with other firms in the family, support 
one another and favour each other in their business dealings. 
However in the context of China the real model for the 
development of enterprise groups is that provided by the South 
Korean chaebols, which are far less structured in their range of 
business than the big Japanese companies and, to some extent, 
more closely linked to the state. In South Korea the ten leading 
chaebols control around two thirds of the economy, and they 
have underpinned the country's rapid rate of economic 
development since the 1960s. The Chinese appear to be 
impressed by the fact that the chaebol helped to transform South 
Korea from a poor hungry nation into a rich one within a 
generation, and that the chaebol are now transforming themselves 
into multinationals. It is however ironic that just as South Korea's 
government is trying to reduce the influence that the chaebol exert 
on the domestic economy, that China's policy makers are 
contemplating the development of their own chaebol.
Small/medium sized SOEs
The Chinese government appears, as previously indicated, to be 
concentrating its reform efforts on some 1,000 of the biggest 
SOEs. The remaining 117,000 consist primarily of smaller and 
medium sized SOEs, where the plan is to turn the majority of 
these firms into:
1. mixed ownership through the creation of joint ventures
2. private enterprises through sales to private domestic 
individuals/ firms
3. private foreign enterprises through sales to foreign private 
individuals/firms as wholly foreign funded enterprises
4. allowed to go bankrupt.
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Both central and local government in China have been 
attempting to reinvigorate small and medium sized SOEs through 
ad hoc experiments with management control. The objective being 
to enable the development of sufficient managerial skills enabling 
these enterprises to operate profitably before they are released 
from state control. A number of "models" for the development of 
these state enterprises can be found particularly at the local 
government level, when they were given renewed authority to 
experiment with their own firms after 1991. With the renewed 
pressure of enterprise losses it was felt that local governments 
were in a better position to deal with loss making smaller 
enterprises. In this regard a number of examples can be identified, 
which show the kind of experiments taking shape in the state 
sector:
1. In Zhucheng city, Shandong province, the sale of 
enterprises/plants to their workers is taking place. This 
experiment has been used extensively with workers 
compulsorily buying shares in their enterprises, electing a 
board of directors and supervisory committee. All but a 
handful of Zhucheng's 288 state owned enterprises have been 
sold, mostly to their workers, producing a remarkable 
improvement in profits according to local officials. Vice 
Premier Zhu Rongji toured the city in March 1996 to approve 
its reforms,
2. in Henan province workers have been involved in electing 
managers in nearly 1,000 factories. Some 85% of them are now 
reported to be making profits.
3. the giving away of state assets to new owners has also 
happened in Zhucheng dty,
4. sale of small state run factories, which had occurred on a very 
limited scale during the 1980s, increased rapidly from 1992-
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93. For example, the city of Wuhan announced a program to 
sell off small state firms to any buyers, including private 
enterprises or groups of investors. This was designed to 
unload loss making enterprises, and included substantial tax 
breaks for buyers who took over firms making large losses or 
with debts greater than assets.
5 . fo istin g  o ff a w eak  SO E  u p on  a w ou ld  be jo in t v en tu re  p artn er 
as a precondition for entry into the Chinese market, thereby 
gaining access to capital and technology to enhance its 
efficiency and profitability,
6. leasing on the basis of a "transfer operate transfer" basis, 
whereby an investor runs an SOE for a period of time, earning 
profits, while returning it to profitability and ultimately back 
to the appropriate authority
Loss making enterprises
The Chinese authorities are taking special measures to deal with 
loss making enterprises according to the nature of their losses, 
and bearing in mind the current low level of development of the 
social safety net. It is estimated that about 70% of the losses of 
SOEs are policy induced, mainly arising from price control. These 
enterprises are mainly concentrated in the transportation and 
energy sectors. If these enterprises are to be financially 
independent, it is necessary to liberalise the prices of the goods 
and services they produce. It is intended to liberalise the prices of 
coal and other energy products over the next three-five years to 
avoid major disruption to the rest of the economy. In the interim 
before profitability, or reduced losses, are ultimately achieved, the 
policy induced losses of those enterprises will continue to be 
subsidised through the budget.
For remaining enterprises that are experiencing losses because 
of poor management, the authorities are providing fiscal and
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financial incentives for them to restructure or move into other lines 
of production. Several thousands of smaller enterprises have been 
either closed or merged with profitable ones to rationalise their 
operations. In some cities, experiments are being carried out to 
allow foreign investors to buy into and restructure existing loss 
making SOEs. Finally, the authorities are cautiously applying the 
bankruptcy law to the enterprises.
Despite the revival of SOE reform since 1993, China has 
clearly not undertaken large scale privatisation of state assets. 
The bulk of the change in ownership structure in the Chinese 
economy has occurred through the growth of non state producers 
— collectives, private and foreign invested companies — rather 
than through the transformation of the state sector. A key 
question facing reformers in China, is whether the continuation of 
predominant public ownership represents an insuperable barrier 
to the functioning of markets and efficient resource allocation. The 
authorities have consistently maintained their preference for 
public ownership as a means of achieving its vision of a socialist 
market economy. Such a system would be characterised by 
increased competition and the elimination of mandatory planning, 
but not necessarily with "private ownership" as in a capitalist 
system. The objective is to retain the predominance of public 
ownership, supplemented by nonstate and private ownership, 
while achieving an effective separation between state ownership 
and control of enterprises. Although the development of a 
socialist market economy is a recent goal (1992), marking an 
important change in the ideology of economic reform in China, 
throughout the reform process ownership structures have been 
modified in a number of important respects with major 
implications for enterprise management. In particular, these 
modifications might be viewed as an attempt to simulate market 
conditions by encouraging profit maximisation behaviour.
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Important changes have taken place at both ends of the 
spectrum of state ownership. As previously discussed the larger 
and more modem and profitable state firms are increasingly being 
"corporatised" into modem corporate forms of various types, 
including limited liability joint stock companies. At the same time, 
local governments have been given greater freedom to deal with 
the smaller and less profitable state firms, and one of the 
methods they have adopted, as indicated previously, is to sell 
them off. As a result the traditional state owned sector is being 
reduced from both ends of the spectrum. In addition many of the 
financial and other preconditions for ownership reform and 
privatisation are being created. In this regard China's two stock 
exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen can be viewed as an 
indication of fundamental change. However it is also important to 
recognise that this has been a tightly controlled experiment, and 
substantial limitations have been imposed on their development. 
The number of companies listed on the two exchanges has been 
tightly controlled by administrative decisions. Moreover, 
ownership of joint stock companies continued to be held 
overwhelmingly by government bodies. For example, of all 
Shanghai joint stock companies at the end of 1992, 62% of the 
share value was held by the government, 24% was held by "legal 
persons" (predominantly other state enterprises), 7% by domestic 
individuals, and 7% by foreign capital. Virtually every individual 
corporation is securely controlled by the government or its agents. 
Thus, the share system, as yet, has not been the vehicle for a 
significant divestment of SOEs, but it has the potential to be so in 
the future.
4. OTHER SOE REFORM RELATED ISSUES
To make the SOEs financially accountable, to judge them by 
strictly economic criteria, and to abide by a hard budget
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constraint, it has been necessary to change the old system of 
employment, social benefits, and housing so that enterprises are 
not burdened with social responsibilities. In this regard a number 
of important developments have already taken place.
Employment
Under the traditional employment system, the state assigned 
workers to enterprises that were obliged to provide jobs. The 
workers were guaranteed lifetime employment and were provided 
with housing, medical, and retirement benefits, and a basic salary 
that depended on the worker's years of service. Such a system 
was: highly rigid; resulted in overstaffing in most SOEs; resulted 
in virtually no labour mobility; produced little correspondence 
between the remuneration of workers and their productivity. 
Employment reform in China is often characterised as trying to 
break the three irons, namely, the iron rice bowl (guaranteed 
employment, housing, and other benefits such as that relating to 
health), the iron chair (job security) and the iron wage (wages that 
are not related to performance). In 1986 a labour contract system 
was first introduced, for all newly recruited workers in the SOEs. 
Under this system, the terms and conditions of employment are 
determined by a contract signed between the employee and the 
enterprise. On the expiration of the contract, both the enterprise 
and the em ployer are free to  choose w hether to  continue or 
terminate the contract. However, progress in introducing the 
system was slow. For example at the end of 1992 it was 
estimated that the system covered only about 16 million workers, 
about 21% of the total number of employees in the SOEs.
In 1992, the authorities announced that reform of the 
employment system would be accelerated. A modified version of 
the labour contract system was to be encouraged for adoption by 
all enterprises as soon as possible. Under this modified system,
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all em p loyees, including m anagers, technicians and  o p erato rs, 
must sign a contract with their enterprises to decide their duties, 
rights and benefits. The maturity of the contracts can either be 
fixed or open ended. Under this system, certain distinctions 
among employees such as permanent versus contract and cadres 
versus workers will be ended. To replace the system of job 
assignment by the state, employment agencies are being 
established to help place the new entrants in the labour force.
The problem of surplus labour in SOEs is one of the most 
difficult issues in reforming the enterprise system. It is estimated 
that excess workers in the government and SOEs may be as high 
as 20 million workers out of a total work force of over 100 
million. To avoid massive unemployment, the authorities are 
encouraging the development of the tertiary sector to absorb this 
surplus labour. Under the old planning system, tertiary activities 
were considered unproductive and therefore not encouraged. As a 
result, many of the services that are essential in the smooth 
functioning of a market system were neglected. Since the onset of 
the reform process, the tertiary sector has grown from about 21% 
to 27% of GNP, but it is still small in comparison with the average 
of 60% in most developed countries. In July 1992, the authorities 
announced several policies to stimulate the development of this 
sector, including: encouraging the use of foreign capital and know 
how; transforming most tertiary businesses into profit oriented 
enterprises; encouraging staff in government organisations and 
SOEs to resign and establish businesses in the service sector; 
decontrolling the prices of most products and services; and 
providing financial and tax incentives. The tertiary sector is 
veiwed by the authorities as having great potential for absorbing 
surplus labour, because this sector is generally more labour 
intensive, comprising, for example, retailing and wholesaling, 
catering, teaching, consulting, and social services. It is envisaged 
that the tertiary sector will play a role analogous to that played
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by the TVEs in absorbing the surplus labour in the agricultural 
sector during the 1980s.
Social security
To enforce a hard budget constraint on SOEs without adverse 
social consequences, an adequate social safety net has to be 
developed. An unemployment insurance scheme was set up in 
1986 to provide benefits to the unemployed. To be eligible, the 
unemployment must have resulted from the following causes — 1. 
bankruptcy of an enterprise, 2. restructuring of an enterprise, 3. 
termination of a labour contract, 4. firing because of violation of 
rules. In addition to cash relief, the unemployment scheme 
provided training to the unemployed and assistance in setting up 
their own businesses. At present the unemployment insurance 
scheme covers more than 70 million employees in the SOEs. In 
some regions, it extends to employees in collective firms, joint 
ventures and private enterprises. To extend the social safety net, 
the authorities are formulating new regulations and plans to 
improve benefits and expand the coverage of the unemployment 
insurance system in the near future. In particular, unemployment 
benefits will be provided to all involuntary unemployment 
regardless of cause, and the coverage will be extended to 
employees in collectively owned and foreign enterprises. Further, 
to facilitate enterprise restructuring, some of the funds will be 
used both to provide training for the surplus labour in the SOEs 
and to develop new jobs.
In the past, retirement benefits were also provided by 
enterprises out of current revenue. In recent years, retirement 
funds have been set up whereby workers and employers are 
required to contribute a certain percentage of the payroll toward 
the funds. At present, such funds are established at the municipal 
level in most cities and counties and at the provincial level in
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about 12 provinces. The intention is to establish a unified national 
retirement fund at an appropriate time in the future. The 
retirement funds have improved the conditions for labour 
mobility, and have relieved enterprises of the burden of providing 
for their retired workers.
Housing
Traditionally housing is an integral part of the employment 
system, and is distributed to workers at a highly subsidised rate 
on an administrative basis. Such a system discourages the 
mobility of labour because the worker will generally not be able to 
keep his/her apartment if he/she leaves the work unit. This 
means that a worker will only leave if the new employer is able to 
provide similar housing. This is a major constraint on labour 
mobility and the establishment of a labour market. To encourage 
the development of a housing market, the authorities have 
announced a program of rent adjustment aimed at reducing the 
subsidy element in housing. This development should lead to the 
commercialisation of the housing sector. Encouragement of the 
sale of housing is another component of housing reform.
5. PRIVATISATION EXPERIENCES OF OTHER ECONOMIES IN 
TRANSITION
Much of the literature on economic transition from a planned to 
market economy focuses upon the need to implement changes that 
will: impose financial discipline upon enterprises, through the 
imposition of a hard budget constraint by eliminating access to 
soft finance in the form of bank credits on easy non commercial 
terms and the accumulation of inter enterprise arrears; lead to the 
opening up of markets to competition; enable the entry of new 
firms and exit of non viable firms to and from such markets; and
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bring about decentralised ownership change. Such changes would 
encourage the necessary conditions for enterprise restructuring, 
and especially amongst state enterprises. As a means of 
increasing competition and improving performance in markets 
and enterprises, decentralisation of ownership, in particular, is 
seen as being a key ingredient. In the context of the Central and 
Eastern European transition economies, as well as the Newly 
Independent States of the former Soviet Union, most have made 
the unambiguous decision to move to decentralised ownership by 
having the majority of their economies under private sector 
control. This has been achieved through the privatisation of state 
assets and, for many the most important way, through the entry 
of new private businesses both domestically and foreign owned.
The imposition of financial discipline, as well as the 
intensification of competition in markets for the products of SOEs 
in these transition economies, has forced them to restructure, with 
the objective of improving their efficiency and profitability. 
However the initial implication of such developments has been 
major labour shedding and a fall in real wages, or a combination 
of the two. For example, in the three leading transition economies 
of Central Europe, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, their 
largest 150 to 200 SOEs reduced their work forces by 32, 47 and 
33 percent respectively between 1989 and 1993 as their sales fell 
by 40 to 60 percent on average. Evidence from the transition 
economies suggest that once SOEs are subject to financial 
discipline show: a more aggressive attitude towards the collection 
of receivables; a much stronger link between profitability and 
investment; a re-orientation of goals from output targets to 
profits; more managerial focus on marketing and product quality.
A key question of concern for the transition economies, and of 
particular interest to China, is whether privatisation is essential 
for imposing financial discipline on enterprises with the objective 
of stimulating their restructuring and enhancing their
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competitiveness. Could such favourable developments also be 
achieved with public or mixed ownership. Empirical literature 
primarily from the 1980s for industrial market economies, 
concludes in general, although not uniformly, that private firms 
exhibit higher productivity and better performance than public 
enterprises. In the transition economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe and the Newly Independent States, because it is quite 
recent, judgment on the impact of privatisation has only recently 
emerged. The first signs are encouraging in many cases, less so in 
others. Evidence from Hungary, Poland Russia and Slovenia, 
suggest that newly privatatised firms behave differently from, 
and better than, state firms, exhibiting more dynamism and 
generating higher profits. This of course may in part be a reflection 
of the fact that only the more productive and profitable state 
firms were the first to be privatised.
Such evidence from these transition economies suggest that 
private ownership can make a difference in terms of enterprise 
performance. However the urgency and speed with which it has 
been conducted, has varied significantly across these economies. 
While it may not represent an optimal solution, a slower process 
of privatisation is likely to be more feasible in an economy where 
the authorities, or workers, are able to exercise enough control 
over state enterprises to prevent managers from absconding with 
state assets, and where domestic saving and growth in the non 
state sector are high. Such conditions would be representative of 
the situation in China and to a much more limited extent in 
Vietnam. On the other hand where enterprise managers are strong 
but the authorities and workers are weak, and where available 
funds are insufficient to meet restructuring needs, it is likely to be 
the case that privatisation will be more urgent. This is more 
representative of the situation arising from the fall of Communist 
governments in Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In a 
number of these European countries this led to the undesirable
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development of "spontaneous" privatisation, in which managers 
purchased state assets very cheaply or simply absconded with 
them, and often in collusion with the former nomenclature elite. 
This occurred in countries such as Belarus, Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Russia and the Ukraine, creating much resentment to many from 
such an illegal form of privatisation.
The transition economies' experience with privatising large enterprises
For many of the European transition economies the primary 
objective of the economic reforms was to bring about market 
economies with predominant private ownership as rapidly as 
possible. This was especially the case for the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland, who have been at the forefront of 
development in the transition process. The initial predominance 
of SOEs in their economies, inevitably, therefore, required moves 
towards their privatisation. However each country has found that 
privatising large and medium size enterprises has been more 
difficult than originally anticipated. The process has not been 
easy due to: policy makers having to weigh up complex and often 
competing goals; the need to satisfy a multitude of competing 
stakeholders; coping with the administrative difficulties involved 
in privatising thousands of firms in a relatively short time; the 
lack of mature and functioning domestic capital markets.
A number of alternative approaches towards privatisation by 
transition economies can be identified, including sales to strategic 
owners, insider buy-outs, and voucher programs involving the 
creation of new financial intermediaries. These efforts are often 
complemented by extensive programs of restitution to 
pretransition owners and by smaller programs of debt equity 
conversions or public offering of shares on newly emerging stock 
markets. As summarised in Table 5 these approaches create trade 
offs among the various objectives set by government from the
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process of privatistion. The major objectives include: improving 
corporate governance and the efficiency of asset usage; 
depoliticising firms by cutting their links to the state; establishing 
new ownership rapidly; increasing firms' access to capital and 
expertise; generating government revenue; and ensuring a fair 
distribution of benefits. The various transition economies have 
adopted an approach to privatisation which best suits their own 
differing priorities and urgencies. In the case of Hungary, for 
example, with its sizeable foreign debt, the need to generate 
government revenue, particularly in the form of hard currency, has 
been viewed as of critical importance. For the Czech Republic this 
has been of considerably less significance. For the Russian 
authorities priority was given to the need to break rapidly from 
the past, while fairness was seen as being more important in the 
case of Poland. The Czechs have consistently stressed the 
significance of privatisation in breaking the link between an 
enterprise and the government, while Estonia's privatisation 
program sought out "real" owners capable of bringing new. money 
and management skills to bear. Table 6 presents a summary of the 
major methods of privatisation of medium sized and large 
enterprises which have been adopted in seven transition 
economies as at the end of 1995.
Table 5 provides only a partial view of the trade-offs arising 
from the alternative approaches to privatisation. An additional 
objective which should be given importance is each options' 
ability to achieve long term institutional building in the context of 
an economy in transtion. While the process of privatisation in 
general can stimulate the development fundamental market 
institutions such as capital markets, legal systems, and business 
related professions, each approach to privatisation sets off a 
complex process of institutional and ownership change whose 
long run results may differ considerably from the shorter run 
picture. For example, mass privatisation may not produce the
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best owners in the short run, but it might lead to a better 
corporate governance in the long run if it promotes the 
development of capital markets (and subsequent rearrangements 
of ownership) and of intermediary monitoring institutions for the 
economy as a whole. This should also be borne in mind.
Table 5
Tradeoffs Among Privatisation Routes for Large Firms
OBJECTIVE
Better Speed Better access More
corporate and to capital government Greater
METHOD governance feasibility and skills revenue fairness
Spontaneous
privatisation ? ? - -
Sale to outside owners + - + +
Management-employee
buyout - + - -
Equal-access voucher
privatisation 7 + ? _ +
Source: T ak en  from  W orld  Bank, W orld  D evelop m en t R ep ort 
1996 , p .52 .
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By number 32 0 2 2 c 9 28 10
By valued 5 0 5 0 2 3 40
Estonia6
By number 6 4 30 0 0 2 4
By value 6 0 12 3 10 0 15
Hungary
By number 3 8 7 0 0 33 22
By value 4 0 2 0 4 12 42
Lithuania
By number <1 5 70 0 0 25
By value <1 5 60 0 0 35
Mongolia
By number 0 0 70 0 0 30
By value 0 0 55 0 0 45
Poland
By number 3 14 6 0 23 54
Russia'
By number 0 5 5 11 0 0 34
Note: Bold numbers show the dominant method of each country. Data are as of the end 
of 1995.
a. Includes transfers to municipalities or social insurance organisations, debt-equity 
swaps, and sales through insolvency proceedings.
b. Number of privatised firms as a share of all formerly state-owned firms. Includes parts 
of firms restructured prior to privatisation.
c. Includes assets sold for cash as part of the voucher privatisation program through 
June 1994.
d. Value of firms privatised as a share of the value of all formerly state-owned firms. Data 
for Poland and Russia are unavailable.
e. Does not include some infrastructure firms. All management buyouts were part of 
competitive, open tenders. In thirteen cases citizens could exchange vouchers for 
minority shares in firms sold to a core investor.
Source: Gray, background paper; World Bank data.
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Privatisation options for medium and large SOEs
A brief elaboration of the potential advantages and 
disadvantages of each of the previously identified methods of 
privatisation is now conducted.
1. Spontaneous privatisation
This is most likely to occur early on in the transition process, 
during the period of time of transfer from Communist government 
control to the establishment of a democratically elected 
government. During this turbulent period state enterprise 
managers can acquire state assets very cheaply by selling the 
assets they control to themselves, or simply abscond illegally with 
them, usually in collusion with members of the former 
nomenclature elite. This occurred extensively in Hungary and 
Russia and resulted in widespread resentment about its 
unfairness, ultimately leading to its eventual abandonment. There 
are major ambiguities over its benefits in terms of better corporate 
governance and its feasibility and desirability. It is also unlikely 
to improve enterprise access to capital and skills, and because 
such enterprises are sold off so cheaply do not generate much 
revenue to government. This is an approach to privatisation 
which should, overall, be avoided.
2. Sales to outsiders
In the early days of transition most of the Central and Eastern 
European countries hoped to privatise by selling state enterprises 
as going concerns on a case by case basis, based upon the 
experiences of the UK and other middle level income countries 
like Chile. Sales to "outside" or "core" investors were also 
favoured since they would bring in revenue and turn the firm over 
to "real" owners possessing the knowledge and incentives to
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govern the company efficiently, as well as having the necessary 
capital to restructure it. Although sales to outside investors have 
largely achieved expected performance improvements, they have 
proved to be disappointing in that they have been: costly and 
slow; more difficult to implement than anticipated; and relatively 
few in number. The latter is primarily due to the limited 
availability of domestic capital, as well as political concerns 
arising from a large dependence on foreign capital. Even where 
domestic capital is sufficient, insiders (managers and other 
employees) have been able to block sales. More generally, the 
process is held back by the sheer enormity of the task of 
evaluating and negotiating deals one by one, and then of following 
up to be sure that the buyers fulfill contract provisions. For 
example, in Germany it is reported that 20% of the thousands of 
privatisation contracts signed by the Treuhandanstalt (the 
privatisation agency) are in dispute. Other difficulties relate to: 
problems with placing a value on firms to be offered for sale; 
appraising and assigning responsibility for past environmental 
damage; its perceived unfairness. Many ordinary citizens cannot 
participate and find the process non transparent and arbitrary if 
not corrupt. Among other transition economies, only Hungary and 
Estonia have privatised a significant share of their enterprises 
through direct sales. In Poland the power of workers to block 
privatisation has considerably slowed progress. The conclusion is 
that such sales, although a useful element in the privatisation 
process, cannot in most circumstances be the sole or even the 
primary method.
A second form of sale to outsiders involves floating shares on 
public stock exchanges. The infancy of stock exchanges limits this 
approach in all the transition economies. Furthermore, the method 
works only for firms with good financial prospects and strong 
reputations. Even Poland, which has had the most success with 
this approach, has privatised fewer than thirty firms in this
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manner. Hungary has had no greater success. Initial public 
offerings are clearly not the answer to the need for rapid, large 
scale privatisation, although at the margin they can help develop 
capital markets and share trading.
3. Management-employee buyouts
Management-employee buyouts are a widely used alternative to 
sales, notably in Croatia, Poland, Romania and Slovenia. Many of 
the firms privatised through Lithuania's and Mongolia's voucher 
programs effectively became management-employee buyouts, as 
employees and their families used vouchers and cash to buy 
major stakes in their own firms. Such buyouts are relatively fast 
and easy to implement, both politically and technically. In theory 
they could also be better for corporate governance if insiders have 
better access to the information needed to monitor managers. 
However the risks and disadvantages are many, particularly in 
large-scale buyout programs that include many unprofitable firms 
in need of restructuring. One disadvantage is that the benefits are 
unevenly distributed, since employees in good firms get valuable 
assets while those in money losers get little or nothing of value. 
Another is that governments typically charge low prices to 
insiders and thereby realise little revenue. In addition 
management-employee buyouts may weaken corporate 
governance, p articu larly  in  transition  econom ies, w here controls 
on managers are less developed than in a fully fledged market 
economy and product and capital markets cannot be counted 
upon to enforce discipline. Insiders are generally unable to bring in 
new skills and new capital, yet may deter outsiders who can from 
investing. Managers or employees may simply prevent outsiders 
from buying shares. Or outsiders may hesitate to invest in firms 
with significant insider ownership because of potential conflicts 
of interest between inside and outside owners. Management-
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employee buyouts can, therefore, lead to managerial and worker 
entrenchment that blocks further reform. Russia's mass 
privatisation program of 1992-94, although it used vouchers, was 
basically a management-employee buyout program because of its 
preferential treatment of managers and workers. In the end 
insiders acquired about two thirds of the shares in the 15,000 
privatised firms. Outsiders obtained 20 to 30% (about 10 to 15% 
each went to investment funds and individual investors), and the 
rest remained in government hands.
4. Equal Access voucher privatisation
The final form of privatisation to be discussed distributes 
vouchers across the population, and attempts to allocate assets 
approximately evenly among voucher holders. Such programs 
have proven to excel in terms of both speed and fairness. On the 
negative side they raise no revenue for government, and have 
unclear implications for corporate governance. Mongolia, 
Lithuania and the former Czechoslovakia were the first to 
implement this form of privatisation. Albania, Armenia, 
Kazakstan, Moldova, Poland, Romania (in its 1995 program), 
and Ukraine have fo llow ed , and  B ulgaria  is n o w  p rep arin g  such a 
program. Some countries (such as Georgia and Russia) have used 
vouchers but given strong preference to insiders. A few countries 
(Estonia and Romania in its 1991 program) have used vouchers to 
transfer only minority stakes in certain firms. Hungary, FYR 
Macedonia and Uzbekistan are among the few privatising 
transition economies that have specifically rejected the use of 
vouchers.
It is widely accepted that the Czech Republic's mass 
privatisation program has been the most successful to date. In 
two successive waves (the first while part of Czechoslovakia), the 
Czechs transferred more than half the assets of state enterprises
48
into private hands. Citizens were free to invest their vouchers 
directly in the firms being auctioned. However, to encourage more 
concentrated ownership and so create incentives for more active 
corporate governance, the program allowed the free entry of 
intermediary investment funds to pool vouchers and invest them 
on the original holders' behalf. More than two-thirds of voucher 
holders chose to place their vouchers with these competing funds. 
The ten largest obtained more than 40% of all vouchers in both 
waves (about 72% of all vouchers held by such funds), leading to 
concentrated ownership of the Czech industrial sector by these 
large funds. This is in stark contrast to the experience of 
Mongolia, which forbade the entry of intermediary funds and 
ended up with heavy inside ownership.
Such intermediary funds are represented on company boards, 
and are demanding better financial information and imposing 
financial discipline on the firms they own. They trade large blocks 
of shares among themselves or sell them to strategic investors. As 
a result a moderately active share market has developed on the 
Prague stock exchange, but is much larger in the over the counter 
system. Clearly, however, patterns of ownership in the Czech 
Republic are still in a state of flux. Some observers hope that the 
intermediary funds, together with banks or in place of them, will 
become the cornerstone of the financial infrastructure, which is 
essential for capital allocation and corporate governance in a 
market economy. Others expect the funds' influence to dwindle 
rapidly as strategic investors pick up controlling blocks of shares. 
In either case the longer term goal of institution building is 
operating well by this approach to privatisation. Hence the Czech 
experience illustrates how a well designed voucher privatisation 
program can overcome many problems. It can depoliticise 
restructuring, stimulate development of capital markets, and 
quickly create new stakeholders with an interest in reform. A 
critical determinant of the longer run success of any reform
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program is the extent to which ownership rights can evolve into 
more efficient forms. Programs that stimulate the growth of 
capital and asset markets, such as the Czech Republic's 
privatisation program, have a distinct advantage In addition 
Governments need also to implement complementary reforms, for 
example regarding the supervision of financial intermediaries and 
the regulation of natural monopolies. In this context the voucher 
privatisation model is one which could be given serious 
consideration by the Chinese authorities, should they wish to take 
the next step of privatising many of the large SOEs.
The transition economies' experience with privatising small enterprises
Small firms have proved much easier to privatise than large ones. 
Most small firms are engaged in trade and service activities with 
simple technology and easy entry. None of the major obstacles to 
privatisation of large entities, such as high capital requirements, 
major restructuring needs and regulatory and governance 
weaknesses, apply to small firms. Local authorities can take 
charge of transferring small units and, because they are easier to 
value, many parties can gain access to enough information for 
open auctions to succeed. Privatised small businesses can serve 
as important schools for entrepreneurs and investors, and can 
absorb labour being shed from large scale enterprises. The former 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland were the first countries to 
achieve widespread ownership of small businesses, using very 
different approaches. The Czechs implemented a centrally 
conceived but locally administered system of open, competitive 
auctions. Poland's program, like its large scale privatisation 
program, was somewhat ad hoc and gave large concessions to 
employees . Hungary had a reasonably sized trade and services 
sector even under central planning, with strong, decentralised 
managerial control through leasehold. This sector grew less
50
through widespread privatisation than through the entry of new 
private competitors. Following these leaders, most other 
transition economies have carried out substantial small scale 
privatisation, and Albania, the Baltic states, Croatia, Russia, and 
Slovenia have caught up with the earlier starters in terms of the 
percentage of small firms divested.
The lessons of experience from enterprise reform are quite clear 
and applicable across the range of transition economies. Firms 
surviving from the era of central planning need major restructuring 
of their production and reorientation of their incentives. Entities 
that face strict financial discipline and competition and have 
clear owners are most likely to undertake the needed restructuring 
or to exit, leaving room for new and better firms. In the short run 
financial discipline can be fostered through stabilisation and 
liberalisation measures, but in the longer run decentralised 
ownership, preferably private, clearly defined property rights and 
supporting institutions are needed to sustain financial discipline, 
to respond to market oriented incentives, and to provide 
alternative forms of corporate finance and governance. This in 
conjunction with the desire for long term institution building 
appropriate for a market economy, would suggest that China 
could learn a great deal from the equal access voucher approach 
to privatisation should, or when, this becomes politically 
expedient.
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper has conducted a review of the more recent 
performance of China's SOEs. Despite reforms initiated in the 
mid 1970s it became clear after the retrenchment period of 1988- 
91 that the performance of the SOEs remained weak, and that 
further reform was required. The adoption of the goal of attaining 
a socialist market economy by the Communist Party in 1992,
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spurred a renewed phase of SOE reform. Emphasis was to be 
given to the corporatisation of SOEs through an intensification of 
the shareholding experiment begun in the 1980s, the establishment 
of enterprise groups along the lines of Korea's chaebols, and small 
and medium sized SOEs were to be sold, leased or in the case of 
loss making enterprises allowed to go bankrupt.
The performance of the SOEs has shown further deterioration 
over the past few years and this has been intensified by the 
implementation of a three year austerity program, implemented 
with the objective of reducing inflation and achieving a more 
sustainable growth rate. The deteriorating performance of the 
large SOEs in 1995 and 1996 led to an expansion of bank loans to 
them, which led many economists to question the government's 
real commitment to SOE reform. However progress is being made 
albeit slowly. Reform has been implemented in areas which have 
adversely affected SOE profits, including that of price 
liberalisation, greater flexibility in the hiring and firing of workers 
and social security reform. The latter reducing the financial 
burden which SOEs face in regard to the provision of housing, 
health, and pensions, and in addition a more widespread 
unemployment insurance scheme. These are essential if further 
reform of SOEs are to be implemented, and most crucially that 
relating to the need to impose financial discipline and to eliminate 
the link between them and the commercial state banking sector. 
Unless this is done further reform of the financial sector will be 
difficult, including the development of instruments for indirect 
macroeconomic control so urgently required in China's emerging 
market economy. This will mean job losses in the state sector. 
However, the encouraging rapid development of the non state 
sector, and in particular the tertiary sector, suggests that some of 
the anticipated 18-20 million workers who will lose their jobs in 
the state sector over the next five years, will be absorbed by the 
dynamic non state sector.
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The experience from other transition economies is that the 
imposition of financial discipline, in conjunction with an opening 
up of markets and increased competition, is the best way to bring 
about an improved performance of SOEs. Decentralisation of 
ownership, also seen as essential, has been achieved in most of 
the other transition economies through both the privatisation of 
SOEs and the entry of new private businesses. In the case of 
China, decentralisation of ownership has been occurring primarily 
through the expanding significance of the non state sector as well 
as limited "privatisation" of large SOEs and the selling off of 
small and medium sized SOEs. In China, however, public 
ownership of the pillar industries of the economy will remain for 
the foreseeable future at least. However reforms in terms of 
corporatisation, the development of stock exchanges, 
standardisation of accounting practices suggest that a framework 
for the future privatisation of large SOEs is being put in place.
A number of privatisation methods adopted in the other 
transition economies were outlined. Some of these could be 
utilised in the context of China's large SOEs at a future date. 
Spontaneous privatisation should be avoided, sales to "core" 
investors of large SOEs may be politically possible in China as 
long as they were to domestic rather than foreign owners, 
management-employee buyouts may be difficult at the large SOE 
level but more practical at the medium to small SOE level, while 
equal access voucher privatisation may provide the most 
appropriate framework of all. The latter would fit well with 
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